Common-Sense World and Stock of Knowledge at Hand: Schützian phenomenology of the social world

This article is part 3 of the collection of articles on discursive cultural psychology. Go to the collection table of contents to read other articles. -- Previous -- Next --

In the following we shall discuss important concepts of Schützian phenomenology of the social world that are relevant for the concept of action. 

To understand the Schützian approach to action, it would be necessary here to use one of its important concepts, that is, the concept of common-sense world. Common-sense world is the world of daily life of people that is believed to exist before one’s birth, have its history, and be given to members in an organized fashion. It is primarily the scene of one’s action and the locus of resistance to action. Thus, it is the arena of social action, within which human individuals come into relationships with each other, and try to come to terms with each other, as well as with themselves. This common-sense world is typically taken for granted. It is experienced by the members’ common-sense through implicit typifications and recognized based on typified constructs or thought objects of what is familiar. These thought objects exist as a combination of hypothetical and actual sense presentations of the world (Schütz, 1967).

The common-sense world then is experienced as unique, and forms certain biographical situations for every human individual. One important feature of biographical situation is what Schütz has called the ‘stock of knowledge at hand.’ It is the stock of knowledge that an individual has in certain moments of his life. This stock is made of typifications of the common-sense world, which consists, for example, of knowledge that the world already exists before one’s birth, that it is inhabited by one’s fellows, but is interpreted by them in typical ways, or that it includes animate beings as well as inert objects. These beings and objects are from the outset perceived typically and within a horizon of familiarity. What is new and different is recognized as unusual since it is contrasted against a background of the ordinary.

Especially relevant for our discussion of action is a kind of knowledge at hand about course-of-action types. Just as knowledge of beings and objects, knowledge of course-of-action is the result of typifications of the common-sense world that is derived from one’s encounters with other beings. Thus, as one may recognize an object as ‘chair,’ he may also recognize, for example, the course-of-action typical in seminars such as presenting opinions, discussing certain topics, raising one’s hand to ask questions, or intending to speak, etc. Such typified course-of-action may be conceived as recipes for handling things, and other people, in order to come to terms with typified situations. Just as one may encounter unusual objects and perceive them typically within a horizon of familiarity, one may also be in unusual situations, and not have any course-of-action at hand to deal with it and act in accord with typifications best approximate to such situations.

Verstehen and Typification of Action: a Schützian Account

Discussions concerning action center around the issue of treating action, as belonging to either the subjective or the objective world. The dilemma is that, on the one hand, if action is to be treated as purely subjective reality, it is impossible for other individuals to access the actor’s intention. As a consequence, it cannot be studied scientifically, and communication between human beings would not be conceivable. On the other hand, if action is to be treated as purely objective, then almost all human higher functions such as consciousness, intentionality and reflexivity would be denied, and human action would be portrayed as being caused by some natural processes.

Parsons’s proposal is to treat action as being caused by some normative processes. Schütz’s theoretical position in this controversy would be to treat action as experientially meaningful and intelligible in terms of social categories and constructs, both for the actor and his fellows. For Schütz, that action is meaningful is axiomatic. Action is constituted (but not caused in a positivistic sense) by social processes in which those meaningful constructs are negotiated and concurred. Action is constituted by how it may be understood (Verstehen) both by the actor and his fellows in certain contexts.

Schütz takes action (Handeln) to mean ‘human conduct as an ongoing process that is devised by the actor in advance, that is, which is based upon a preconceived project.’ (1967, p.67). Implied in this notion is an actor that is capable of reflection on his situations, possible actions, and ends. That means, action is purposive and projective, and has its source in the consciousness of the actor. An end is not merely given by internalized values and norms of community like in Parsons’s action, but instead, results from one’s phantasying, from one’s forethought, or projected state of affairs.

One important feature of action, in Schützian account, is that the action has certain meanings for the actor himself. He subjectively interprets the meaning of his own action. This subjective Interpretation of meaning however is, above all, a typification of the common-sense world, the actual way in which human individuals in daily life do interpret their own and each other’s behavior. Schütz treats this understanding (Verstehen) of one’s own and other’s action as axiomatic. Verstehen here is taken to mean simply that human individuals in daily life interpret their world from the outset as a meaningful one. Movements of one’s own and the other being’s body are understood or treated as the conduct of purposeful creatures that have motives and goals.

 Intersubjective World and Understanding of Social Actions

The Schützian notion of action may seem to be purely subjective. One may raise questions concerning how understanding of social action is possible. Indeed, we have started to discuss the notion of action as if it is purely subjective; as if ‘the world were my private world.’ Such is not the case. On the contrary, action is, from the outset, embedded in an intersubjective world of culture. Schütz (1967) then continues to explain that:

It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them. It is a world of culture because, from the outset, the world of everyday life is a universe of significance to us, that is, a texture of meaning which we have to interpret in order to find our bearings within it and come to terms with it. (Schütz, 1967,  p.10).

Intersubjective world is a world consists of webs of meaning that simultaneously constitute and are constituted by social actions intended and interpreted by members of certain interacting communities. This process of intending and interpreting actions can be conceived also as a form of negotiation of meaning. An actor A, who performs an action with certain intended meaning, can be conceived as proposing certain meaning. His fellow actor B, then, also proposes an interpretation of A’s action meaning through his action which is in turn interpreted by A.

Through such process of intending and interpreting meaning of action, the intersubjective world is constantly maintained and becomes the taken-for-granted background of human activities. The meaning, and the intersubjective world, that results from meaning negotiation process, supersede the private experiences of both A and B such that they are conceived to be ‘objective’ and anonymous.  

-- Previous -- Next --