Parsons’s Theory of Action and its Critiques

This article is part 2 of the collection of articles on discursive cultural psychology. Go to the collection table of contents to read other articles. 

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The notion of action in the discipline of psychology however is a recent one (Straub, 1999). This is especially true if one compares it with the discipline of sociology. Since Weber, the notion that action involves an actor’s subjectivity has entered sociology and has been discussed very extensively (Parsons, 1949). To integrate it into a discursive cultural psychological framework, we shall draw several important points from discussions in sociology. Talcott Parsons  (1949) presents a powerful analysis of major theorists such as Weber, Durkheim, Pareto and Alfred Marshall. Parsons noted that there is latent convergence among them, that is, in analyzing society they all proposed a  ‘voluntaristic theory of action’ that takes an actor’s subjectivity into account.

Parsons's Theory of Action

In analyzing human action, Parsons asserts that there is an indispensable logical framework that serves as a reference like axiomatic space-time framework in Newtonian mechanics as the a priori basis. This action frame of reference consists of four elements: an actor; an end; a current situation; and a mode of orientation. A current situation may be distinguished into two categories: the conditions which are beyond the actor’s control, and the means which the actors can control. A mode of orientation provides directions for actions. It consists of at least one selective standard, in terms of which the actor relates the end to the current situation. 

One may see that this conceptualization of action puts more emphasis on an actor’s subjective point of view. It is axiomatic that an ‘end’ can only exist ‘in the mind’ of the actor. Selective standards cannot be conceived as anything but subjective in character. What appears as ‘the conditions’ and ‘the means’ in the situation may exist objectively, but their characterizations as conditions and means would be determined by the actor’s ends and certain selective standards.

In sum, this conceptualization of action stresses the subjective direction of human effort to overcome real world obstacles. Action is viewed as a process of the alteration of conditional elements in the direction of conformity with norms and values. Thus, an end is viewed as expressing values of certain interacting community; and the selective standards in terms of which actions are oriented are either rational or normative (non-rational). Norms and values are internalized by the actor through interactions with other members of his community. The actor is seen as capable of reflection on his current situations but not on those norms and values that have been internalized. Thus, these norms and values, once internalized, become the causes of actions, which are external to the action themselves. One may conclude that in Parsons’s theory, the actor’s knowledge is only limited to circumstances, and is blind concerning norms and values, which motivate the action.

Central to Parsons’s theory of action is the distinction between rational and non-rational action. Rational action is taken to mean those actions that:

”....pursue ends possible within the conditions of the situation, and by means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science.” (Parsons, 1949, p.58)

Thus, an action is said to be rational if it is guided by a reference to accurate knowledge, possessed by a scientific observer. Implicit in this notion of rationality, is the neo-kantian correspondence theory of knowledge (see Rorty, 1979). It is assumed that the empirical world consists of externally given states of affairs, whose existence is entirely independent of the ways they may be known by human beings. Knowledge is said to be rational if it corresponds accurately to states of affairs in the empirical world.

This is not to deny human perspectives and practical interests which may bias human knowledge. Given scientific method however it is possible to make approximations to objective world. On the contrary, when an actor’s knowledge does not adequately represent an objective empirical world, or when the knowledge is a reflection of the actor’s sentiments or values, the action is said to be non-rational.  In this case an actor is potrayed as blind not only to the internalized norms and values, but also to the reasons that guide his action. In non-rational action, the actor is incapable of reflexivity.

Critiques of Parsons's Theory of Action

As Heritage (1984) has pointed out, this conceptualization of rational and non-rational action is problematic when confronted by actors who, despite their non-rationality from the scientific point of view, can account for their actions by citing particular aspects of their circumstances as relevant to their decisions, and take them to be ‘rational’ decisions. Parsonian theorists would now be faced with conflicts between the scientist’s rational account and the actor’s ‘rational’ account for their own action. Moreover there are also facts that ‘lay’ actors in certain interacting communities may treat one another’s account as intelligible and real. Heritage has called this problem as the problem of rationality in Parsons’s theory of action, that is, ‘the problem of what kind of significance to accord to actors’ account of their reasons for action.’

Another problem is the problem of reflexivity. It has been noted above that in Parsons’s theory of action, the actor is said to be blind to norms and values which have been internalized. His action motives are portrayed as driven by various normative processes. Thus, the actor is conceptualized as incapable of exercising moral choices, and cannot, but act in accord with internalized norms. Heritage asserted that one of the reasons why the reflexivity of the actor is denied is the fear to fall into earlier version of rationalistic positivism. If the actors are capable of reflection on their own internalized norms and values, then normative foundations would be theoretically treated as part of conditions of the actions which can be ‘rationally’ analyzed, just as in positivism they were conceived as adjusting to the constraints of the physical environment.

The third problem with Parsons’s theory of action is what Heritage called the problem of intersubjectivity. If the elements of one’s actions are subjective, how are we to account for the fact that it is understood and considered intelligible by other individuals? Parsons deals with the problem of intersubjectivity of knowledge by proposing that, in the case of rational action, actors attend to identical empirical states of affairs in the objective world. Provided that they employ scientific methods and construct adequate representations, they would arrive at similar knowledge of the world.

Thus for Parsons, intersubjective knowledge is identical to objective one. This portrait however is very narrow and cannot account for the fact that intersubjective knowledge may also exist in non-rational action. To account for this fact, as before, Parsons used his institutionalization of norms theorem. Members of certain interacting communities may have shared knowledge since there are common value and norm standards, that are established and institutionalized prior to social interactions. Again, in this view the problem is that actors are portrayed as merely following shared rules that govern members’ actions.

The Parsons’s theory of action has provided a useful framework for analyzing action. For our purpose to make an account for analyzing cultural differences in problem solving group discussions however, it is not adequate. Some part of his theory and its assumptions, such as the action frame of reference and his rejection of rationalistic positivism may still be useful and may become the basis of our framework. We shall continue to build the basic tenets of our discursive cultural psychology by following the path provided by Garfinkel’s (1967; Heritage, 1984) critique of Parsons’s theory of action which is based mainly on Schützian phenomenology of the social world.

There are three main points of critique of Parsons’s theory of action that Garfinkel has made (Heritage, 1984). First, he rejected the assumption of the neo-kantian correspondence theory of knowledge. It is not denied that actors have knowledge in the form of representations of states of affairs both in the social and natural world. Along with Rorty (1979) however, it is denied that knowledge should, or need, or even is able to accurately represent an actor’s world. Constructing accurate representations may be possible in very limited areas such as natural sciences. As a consequence, the notion of rational action which is based on such theory of knowledge has also lost its relevance, or at worst, is impossible.

Secondly, Garfinkel rejected the view that normative rules determine human action such that an actor cannot, but act in accord with such rules. Related to this, he also rejects that institutionalized and prior-to-interaction established rules are the only base of intelligibility of actions and social understandings such that communication is possible only through following them.

Thirdly, Garfinkel asserted that lay actor’s reasoning cannot be treated as irrelevant and evaluated against scientific positivistic reasoning. On the contrary actor’s common-sense reasoning is subjectively real such that it becomes the base of one’s decisions to choose certain courses of action; and also intersubjectively real such that the actions may be intelligible and accountable to others.

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