Context-constitutedness of Action: Leontiev's Theory of Activity

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One remarkable thing in the efforts to analyze action is that it is very difficult to conceive of any action without its contexts. Just imagine an action of throwing a ball into a basket in basket ball game. One may analyze this action by breaking down its movements into smaller parts, such as holding the ball, raising it above one’s head, then throw it into the basket. It is even still possible to break them down into various smaller muscle's movements.

A question can be raised at this point: Do these movements constitute the action as playing basket ball? Something essential that constitute the action is missing when one analyzes it only in terms of its movements. An action should be put into its context if it is to be meaningfully analyzed. This context-constitutedness of action may be best formulated by Rosnow and Georgoudi (1986, p.6) who write, ‘an act or event cannot be said to have an identity apart from the context that constitutes it; neither can a context be said to exist independently of the act or event to which it refers.’

Leontiev (1981) has conceptualized contexts in unit of analysis that is termed activity. Thus action and activity are units at different level of analysis. Such analysis level is characteristic of Vygotskian activity theory (Wertsch, 1981; 1985). At each level, different criteria are used to define the units. Activities (Tätigkeiten) are the unit analysis at higher level which are distinguished on the basis of their motive and the object toward which they are oriented; actions (Handlungen), at a lower level, on the basis of their goals; and operations, at still lower level, on the basis of the conditions under which they are carried out.

Activities are the ”larger” unit that become the contexts in which actions retain their meaning. Actions that are detached from their activity context are devoid of meaning. Furthermore, action without operation would be a hollow concept since operations are what make them concrete. Operations are the particular modes in which actions are undertaken. Leontiev (1981) has formulated the concept of activity as follows:

Activity is the nonadditive, molar unit of life for the material, corporeal subject. In a narrower sense (i.e., on the psychological level) it is the unit of life that is mediated by mental reflection. The real function of this unit is to orient the subject in the world of objects. In other words, activity is not a reaction or aggregate of reactions, but a system with its own structure, its own internal transformations, and its own development (Leontiev, 1981, p.46).

Examples of the so-defined activities are games (chess, basket ball, soccer), lectures at universities, classes at schools, problem solving discussion in work groups, etc. An operation of throwing a ball into a basket cannot be conceived as action and would be meaningless if it is detached from its context, i.e. the activity of playing basket ball. Forming a clay pot would be meaningful if it is put into the context, for example, of handicraft business enterprise. One may readily observe that the action of forming a clay pot can be put into another context, for example, the activity of an artist who has certain aesthetic values.

The same action may have various functions in various activity contexts (Leontiev, 1981, p.61). This way, activity as a molar unit functions to orient subject’s actions in the world of objects. Actions, however, are not only ‘parts’ of activity. As expressed by Leontiev (1981, p.61) human activity exists only in form of an action or a chain of actions. The existence of activity is also constituted by its relevant actions. Without them, activity would be only an abstract notion. 

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