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Questions may be asked if it is said that action is rule-governed: in what sense is action governed by rules? What is it for an action to follow a rule? How is one to conceive the concept ‘rule?’
Wittgenstein’s Language Game
Winch (1958) provides us with a framework to conceive of action as rule-governed. In his discussion he starts with a Wittgenstein account on how, using a word, an act of referring is rule-governed. His question first is ‘how is it for a word to have a meaning or a function of referring?’ How is it, for example, ‘that one, using the word ‘Everest’ is able to refer to certain peaks in the Himalayas’ (p.25). A natural answer to this question would be that it has been defined to him before. The Everest has been pointed out, and he has been told that its name is ‘Everest.’ By virtue of those actions in the past he is now able, using the word ‘Everest’ to mean certain peaks in Himalayas.
The rule that governs the act of referring above is that words are to be used in the same way. In this case the act of referring using the word ‘Everest’ is governed by the rule that they should be used only to refer to certain peaks in Himalayas. In a more formal expression, the word ‘Everest’ counts as ‘certain peaks in Himalayas.’ Thus, if it is used to refer to peaks in Austria, one may say that the act of referring is wrong.
The rule that words are to be used in the same way however would depend on the context. Suppose, in learning English, instead using the word ‘Everest’ the teacher uses the word ‘mount’ and points to the peaks in Himalayas. The students would be said to be correct in using the word ‘mount’ to mean or refer to both the peaks in the Himalayas and the peaks in Austria. Thus, in order to decide whether or not one action is following a rule, one would have to know the context in which the rule is applied.
One other important element of rule that is discussed by Winch is its distinction from mere regularity and its social nature. Suppose an individual uses the word ‘Alps’ to mean the peaks in Himalayas in all similar occasions consistently. His action can be said to have regularity since he uses the word in the same way, in similar occasions, but he cannot be said to act in accord with the rule of using the word ‘Alps.’ Despite its regularity, other people are able to recognize that the action is wrong.
What makes some regularities of action rule-following, is the reactions of other people (p.30). One’s action can be said to follow certain rules only when it is possible for someone else to grasp what he is doing. In contrast to mere regularity, the notion of following a rule is logically inseparable from the notion of making a mistake. This notion is also made possible through interpersonal agreement. Thus establishing a standard (right or wrong) is not an activity which makes sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation.
Weber’s Meaningful Behavior
Winch brought this discussion further as a frame work to give an account on rule-governed action in general outside the act of speech. He pointed out that all meaningful behavior is rule-governed. Just as words, actions have meanings in accordance with certain rules as well. Thus Winch spoke of those behaviors of which one can sensibly say that they have a meaning, a symbolic character. In this area he follows Weber’s account of meaningful behavior. In this account, behavior is meaningful in so far the agent or agents associate a subjective sense (Sinn) with it. The subjective sense of behavior means that it is subjectively intended. This sense is related to its motive, that is, a meaningful configuration of circumstances which, to the agent or observer, appears as a meaningful reason (Grund) of the behavior.
Just as word meaning refers to its referent (Everest-certain peaks in Himalayas), the meaning of behavior refers to its motive structure in accord with some rules that are socially constituted. As a paradigm case of actions that are performed for a reason, Winch provides an example. Suppose A has voted Labor at the last General Election because he thought that a labor government would be the most likely to preserve industrial peace. Prior to voting he has discussed the pros and cons of voting Labor and as a conclusion he said that he would vote Labor because that is the best way to preserve industrial peace.
In this example, the behavior of marking slips of paper and dropping them into boxes that counts as ‘to vote’ is a symbol or representation of A’s motive structure and the political structure in which he lives. A’s behavior would not make sense if there does not exist and he does not know the rules that symbolically relate his behavior and the government which comes into power after the election.
At this point, one may argue that the rule described above may be better termed definition but not rule. It may be argued that a rule must take an imperative form that regulates behavior, for example, ‘Drive slowly’ (Do X), or ‘On highway, one should not drive faster than 100 Km/h’ (If Y, do X). As such, not all meaningful behavior is rule-governed. It may be argued that actions that are the result of one’s reasoning are not governed by such rules.
Searle’s Constitutive Rules
So what kind of rule is it that governs such actions? Searle (1969) has pointed out that there are two kinds of rules, that is, regulative and constitutive. Regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior. The behavior of driving a car on the highway can exist independently, whether or not there is a regulative rule that regulates it. One can in principle ignore such a rule and still he can drive his car on the highway. In contrast, constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they also create or define new forms of behavior.
The behavior of throwing a ball into a basket cannot be said to exist without the rules of basket ball. The behavior of uttering ‘Everest’ cannot be said to mean ‘certain peaks in Himalayas’ without the constitutive rules that govern the use of the word ‘Everest.’ The behavior of ‘marking slips of paper and dropping them into boxes’ cannot be said meaningful without the constitutive rules that create the symbolic relations between the action ‘to vote’ and the government. Constitutive rules take a form ‘X counts as Y’ or ‘X counts as Y in context C.’
Thus uttering the word ‘Everest’ counts as ‘to mean certain peaks in Himalayas’; the behavior of ‘marking slips of paper and dropping them into boxes’ counts as ‘to vote’ in the context of a democratic political structure; in contrast, the same behavior ‘marking slips of paper and dropping them into boxes’ does not count as ‘to vote’ in the context of a patriarchal political structure. Applied to action in general, this formula may be described as follows ‘a behavior counts as intending certain meanings (thus, action) in certain contexts.’
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